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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF U'TAH

T'HE MOF}j-,AT COUNTY STATE
BANK, a ·Colorado corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.

9166

-vs.R. J. PINDER,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ST~TEMENT

OF FACTS

Throughout this brief, R indicates pages of the
record. Some italicized emphasis has been added throughout by respondent.
1
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Respondent agrees with the major portion of the
statement of the facts as set forth in appellant's brief.
However, respondent controverts appellant's statement
made at page 10 of his brief, that the check in question
was executed and delivered in Utah. (See also pages 18
and 21 of appellant's brief.) This statement is not true.
the check was executed and delivered in Colorado (R. 15
and Supplemental Record).
Respondent also feels that the circumstances surrounding appellant's stop-payment order should be made
clear. Appellant appears to take the position that such
order did not become effective until after the check was
dishonored and returned to respondent. See page 19 of
appellant's brief.
The facts are that on October 17, 1956, the check
passed through the Clearing House and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco at Salt Lake City, in transit
to the drawee bank at Midvale (R. 8). On October 20th,
the check was processed by an officer of the drawee
bank, who, knowing of the appellant's stop-payment order,
designated it to be returned marked "refer to maker,''
because payment had been stopped (R. 6, 8). 8aid bank
would have paid the check on that day if payment had
not been stopped (R. 6).
As a conflict of laws n1atter probably must first be
resolved in deciding this case, respondent will discuss appellant's Point II before discussing his Point I.
2
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE LAW OF THE STATE OF COLORADO MUS'T BE
APPLIED IN DETERMINING THE LEGAL STATUS OF
PLAINTIFF.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF IS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE AND,
THEREFORE, FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION IS NOT A
DEFENSE TO 'THE ACTION.
(A) UNDER THE LAW OF UTAH.
(B) UNDER THE LAW OF COLORADO.
POINT III.
PROTEST OF THE CHECK WAS NOT REQUIRED, AND
THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT DRAWER IS NOT DISCHARGED.
POINT IV.
INTERES'T SHOULD BE .COMPUTED FROM THE DATE
OF DISHONOR.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LAW OF THE STATE OF COLORADO MUS'T BE
APPLIED IN DETERMINING THE LEGAL STATUS OF
PLAINTIFF.

The entire argument of appellant in support of his
Point II is founded upon a false premise, to-wit, that the
instant check was drawn in Utah. It was not drawn in

3
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Utah, but was executed and delivered in the State of Colorado (R. 15 and Supplemental Record).
It is interesting to note that appellant, at page 20
of his brief, seeks to place respondent on the horns of a
dilemma by assuming that respondent desires to take
inconsistent positions in regard to this matter of fact.
Respondent has never contended that this check was an
inland bill, but has at all times agreed with appellant's
statement to the lower court that it is a foreign bill.
Rather, it is appellant, not respondent, who is in serious
difficulty by attempting to disregard the facts as he, himself, stated them to be. He now seeks to deny one of the
two grounds expressly stated by him as a basis for his
motion for summary judgment-seeks to deny it, that is,
until he arrives at his Point III, where it does not seem
like such a bad idea after all.
Let's have the record speak for itself, so that we
may set the fact at rest and proceed to discuss resultant
legal conclusions. Appellant's 1notion for summary judgment of dismissal (R. 15) reads:
'~COMES NOW the defendant, R. J. Pinder,
and moves the Court for its Judgment of no cause
of action and as grounds for said Motion shows
the Court as follows:

"1. That the instrument sued upon is a negotiable instrument which was executed and delimere~d ~11 the State of Wyoming and that the plaintiff
has not protested the instrument as is required on
a foreign bill of exchange.
4
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"2. [That plaintiff is not a holder in due
course.]

"

"

At the hearing of the respective motions for summary judgment, appellant's counsel stated to the court
that by mistake the words "State of Wyoming" appear
in paragraph 1 of his motion instead of "State of Colorado," and that he intended it to read "State of Colorado.''
Details in connection with this are set forth in the Statement of Proceedings, which was duly settled and approved by the lower court (Supplemental Record).
A statement of the grounds for a motion is not mere
surplusage but is required by URCP Rule 7(b) (1). When
the statement of the factual grounds for appellant's motion was acquiesced in by respondent, which it then was
and at all times has been, it became an admission of a
fact n1aterial to a decision in the cause. But now appellant, for the first time, attempts to completely reverse his
position. He now says that the check was executed and
delivered in Utah, and is an inland bill. In his motion
for summary judgment, appellant acknowledged the check
to be a "foreign bill of exchange" and grounded his motion
upon that fact (R.l5).
The check is foreign in fact (executed and delivered
outside Utah) although it appears on its face to be an
inland bill (purports to be both drawn and payable in
Utah). See Britton on Bills and Notes (1943) §225.
There is a difference in the conflicts rule concerning
liability of a maker of a promissory note or an acceptor

5
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of a bill of exchange (who are primarily liable) from the
rule concerning liability of an indorser or a drawer of a
bill of exchange (who are secondarily liable). Only the
second situation is present in the instant case.
There is also a different rule applicable to (a) matters concerning the nature and effect of a mercantile
instrument than to (b) matters concerning the indorsement and transfer thereof. Compare Restatement of
Conflict of Laws §336 with §349, and compare 11 Am.
Jur., Conflict of Laws §§ 150, 151 with §148. Matters in
group (a) are not now being challenged before this court;
matters in group (b) are.
Four possible conflicts rules may be considered in
determining the status of a holder of a bill of exchange
as against the drawer, i.e., the law of one of four different
places could conceivably apply:
(1) Where drawn.
(2) Where transferred to the holder.
(3) Where payable.
(4) Where sued upon.
As might be imagined, the authorities are not entirely in agreement as to which jurisdiction should control. Nevertheless, (4), the forum, has been almost universally rejected. 95 ALR 667.
As to (3), the place payable, liability of the drawer
of a bill (a secondary party) has generally been held not
to be governed by the law of the place where it is to be
paid. 11 Am. Jur. 446, Conflict of Laws §151. It should
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be observed at this point that nearly every case cited in
appellant's brief, for the proposition that the place where
payable governs, is a case involving either the maker of
a promissory note or the acceptor of a bill of exchange,
both of whon1 are primarily liable. A careful reading
of appellant's other authorities will show either that they
relate to parties primarily liable or that they declare the
place where a bill was drawn to govern.
This leaves the question whether the controlling law,
as between the holder of a bill and the drawer, should be
that of (1) the place where the bill was drawn, or (2)
the place where it was transferred to the holder. The
authorities differ here. It is generally held that the place
where drawn controls, but there is highly respected authority, most of it recent, that the place of transfer governs in determining the status of the holder as against the
drawer. We shall present some group (1) authorities
first.
At 11 Am. Jur. 437, Conflict of Laws §144, it is
stated:
". . . The question as to what law governs any
particular relation of contract under negotiable
paper is best determined, as a general rule, by
first inquiring whether the liability is a primary
or a secondary one-that is, whether the person
is absolutely required to pay the bill or note according to its terms, or whether he is only secondarily or conditionally liable. The law of the place
where the note or bill is payable ordinarily governs in Inatters incident to the primary obligation,
such as the manner or mode of making presentment and the details connected therewith, whereas

7
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where the liability is conditional and dependent
upon the necessity for presentment or demand and
protest, these must be made in accordance with
the law of the place where the contract of the
drawer or indorser is made."
An annotation at 95 ALR 658, published in 1935, discusses "Conflict of laws as regards title to commercial
paper and right of holder to enforce it as against the
drawer or primary obligor." The annotation is appended
to United States v. Guar,anty Trust Co., discussed below
as an authority for group (2), place of transfer. It is the
latest annotation in ALR or ALR 2d on this subject. The
note supplements prior ones in 19 LRA (NS) 665 and
61 LRA 193, which express the view that the place where
the bill was drawn controls. At 19 LRA (NS) 665, 672
it is stated:
"Liability of and defenses available to drawer
or indorser.
"The later cases recognize and apply the
general principle stated and formulated at page
212 of the earlier note [61 LRA 193], to the effect
that the contract of the drawer or indorser (the
secondary obligors) is not only a separate contract
which has a situs of its own independent of that
of the maker or acceptor (the primary obligor) but
also that his obligation is to pay, in the event of
the default of the primary obligor, nO't at the place
oi payment expressly or impliedly named in the
bill or note, but at the place where iJn a legal sense,
h~s contract was 'made.
At 61 LRA 193, 212 the annotator states:
"[Discussion of argun1ent, sometimes made,
that law of place of payn1ent should govern.] But

8
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it is held by the great weight of authority not only
that the contract of the drawer and indorser is a
separate and independent contract, but also that
such eontract is to pay, in the event of the default
of the prirnary obligor, not at the place of payment
expressly or in1pliedly in the bill or note, but at
the place where, in a legal sense, the contract of
the drawer or indorser was made."
More recent authority supports group (2), that
the place of transfer to the holder controls. At 11 Am.
Jur. 441, Conflict of Laws §148, it is stated:

"Law Gove,rning Indorsements and Transfers; Rights of H alders- The transfer of a negotiable instrument is a new and independent contract. According to the general rule, this transfer
is governed by the law of the place where it is
made. . . . The English decisions leave the general
question of what law governs the transfer of commercial paper in a somewhat unsettled state. The
recent tendency, however, in cases where the instruments are transferred by indorsement, is to
hold that the validity of the transfer must be
governed by the law of the country in which the
transfer takes place.
"This same rule applies where the transfer
is by indorsement; that is, it is governed by the
law of the place where the indorsement is made,
and not by the law of the place where the bill
or note is payable or where suit thereon is brought
or the law of the place of residence of the indorser.
"The t~tle of a holder of a negotiable instrument which depends 'ttpon a transfer by indorsement or otherwise is li,kewise governed by the law
of the place where the indorsement or transfer ~s
made.
9
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"The question also arises as to the law governing the title and the right to recover of an indorsee under a foreign indorsement of a bill or
note, as against the maker, the drawer, or the acceptor. In this respect, a distinction has been
drawn in England between what are designated
as 'inland bills' (negotiable paper made and to be
paid in the same country) and 'foreign bills' (negotiable paper made in one country and to be paid or
accepted in another). In the case of inland bills,
the view is taken that the validity of the indorsement and its sufficiency to convey title to the
holder so that he may recover against the primary
obligor or the drawer are to be determined not by
the law of the place where the indorsement is
made, if it is made at a place other than that where
the instrument was executed or is to be paid, but
by the law governing the primary obligor's or
drawer's contract. On the other hand, in the case
of foreign bills-bills drawn in one country upon
a drawee in another-the opposite view is taken,
to the effect that the law of the place of indorsement governs the title of the indorsee and his right
to recover from the primary obligor or the drawer.
"[Footnote 9 :] Annotation: 95 ALR 662, 663.
The distinction pointed out between an inland
bill and a foreign bill seems to proceed upon sound
legal principles. The drawer or acceptor of an
inland bill contemplates the negotiation of the bill
only in the country of its origination, and therefore, even if, contrary to such contemplation, the
bill is indorsed in a foreign country, he undertakes
to pay to the holder only in the event his title is
good according to the law of the country where
his (drawer's or acceptor's) liability originated,
irrespective of what 1nay be the status of the title
under the law of the country where the indorse-
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1nent is made. Not so with the drawer or acceptor
of a foreign bill. He contemplates that the bill
will be negotiated in foreign countries and his
undertaking may, in this view, be said to be to
pay to anyone who acquires a good title, wherever
the bill is negotiated, irrespective of what the
status of the title might be under a like indorsement if made in the country where his (the
drawer's or acceptor's) liability originates. Annotation: 95 A.L.R. 665."
In 1934 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
upon the question in UniJted States v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 293 U.S. 340, 79 L. Ed. 415, 55 S. ·Ct. 221, 95 ALR
G51. In this case a check was drawn and delivered in
the District of Columbia upon a bank in the District of
Columbia. It was subsequently indorsed and transferred
to defendant in Jugoslavia. The Supreme Court held
that the law of the country to which a check payable to
one there resident was mailed by the drawer governs the
determination of the question whether good title thereto
can be acquired by a transferee in due course where its
purported indorsement by the payee was there forged.
If the holder's title is good there, it is good elsewhere,
even in a country where it would not have been good if
the forgery had there taken place.
The rule of this case, that the law of the place of
indorsement governs, has been followed in United States
v. Lemons, (DC Mo) 67 F. Supp 985 (1946), and in P1mtel v. K.N.H. Mohamed & Bros., et .al., 107 Cal. App. 2d
328, 237 P2d 315 (1951).
11
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The Restatement of Conflict of Laws makes no distinction between inland and foreign bills, or between
primary and secondary liability, but refers to the law of
the place of transfer to determine whether or not a holder
takes good title :
"§349. TRANS:E.,ER OF NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENT.

"The validity and effect of .a transfer of a
negotiable instrument are determined by the law
of the place where the instrument is at the time
or its transfer.
"Comment:

"
"e. While any defense which grows out of
the original making or discounting of a negotiable
instrument is governed by the law of the place of
contracting, a defense which grows out of the circumstances of the transfer is determined by the
law of the place of transfer.
"Illustration:
"1. A negotiable bill of exchange, drawn in
State X, is delivered over to a bona fide holder
with a forged indorsement in State Y. By the law
of X, a forged indorsement does not transfer the
instrument; by the law of Y a bona fide holder
gets title. The holder takes a good title to the bill."
Goodrich on Conflict of Laws (Third Edition) supports this view, at page 498:
"That the law of the place of transfer governs
is supported by authority, though there has been
surprisingly little litigation of the question."
Where the place the bill was drawn and the place
of transfer is the same, the question as to which of the

12
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two controls need not be decided, of course. Under the
facts in the instant case, as respondent feels them
clearly to be established, the check was both drawn by
appellant and subsequently transfer '" r1 to respondent in
Colorado.
0

By the consensus of nearly all opinion dealing with
the conflict of laws rule applicable to the right of a holder
of a bill of exchange to enforce it against the drawer,
the place where it was drawn or the place where it was
transferred to the holder controls. The place of transfer
is preferred by most recent authorities. But either doctrine invokes the law of Colorado in this case.
POINT II
PLAINTIF F IS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE AND,
THEREFORE, FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION IS NOT A
DEFENSE TO THE ACTION.
(A) UNDER THE LAW OF UTAH.

Appellant relies upon the decision in Western Cream-

ery Co. v. Malia, et .al., 89 Utah 422, 57 P (2d) 743. For
the reasons stated above, it is respectfully submitted that
the law of Utah is not determinative of respondent's
status as against appellant. But even if it were, we feel
that the Western Creamery case is not in point under
our factual situation for the reason that there the depositor did not draw against the check nor receive any
payment thereon. In other words, there the bank of deposit did not give any value for it.

13
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(B) UNDER THE LAW OF COLORADO.

No discussion is necessary of the established rule
that a holder in due course holds the instrument free from
the defense of failure of consideration that may be available to prior parties among themselves. NIL 57. And
every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due
course. NIL §59.
Is respondent a holder in due course under Colorado
law~

In Colorado, a bank becomes the owner of a check
deposited with it when it extends credit to the depositor
and permits the depositor to withdraw against such
credit, although the deposit agreement provides that the
bank is merely an agent for collection. The Colorado case,
Bromfield v. Cochr.an et al., 283 Pac. 45, 86 Colo. 486,
is controlling in the situation now before this court, and
it is felt appropriate to quote from this decision at length
here:

"
uMoore., J. George A. Stahl, as receiver of
the Broadway National Bank, brought suit in the
county court of the city and county of Denver
against Cochran & Cochran, co-partners, the
Rockwell Investment Company, and the Parker
Realty Company, corporations, to recover $652.41.
The complaint charged that the Rockwell Investment Company and the Parker Realty Company,
for a valuable consideration, ma.de, executed and
delivered a certain check drawrn on the International Trust Company, dated D·ecember 16,
1925, and payable to Horace B. Cochran and
James M. Cochran in the sum of $1,497.30; that
14
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said check was indorsed unconditionally by the
payees, and thereafter deposited in their account
at the Broadway National Bank, payees using a
deposit slip which contained the following provisions: 'All checks, drafts and other items drawn
on or payable at other banks are offered for
deposit to, and received by, this bank as a forwarding agency * * * and will be credited prov~sionally sttbject to final cash payment, the bank
reserving the right to decline payment of checks
drawn against such credits,' that said amount
was credited to the account of defendants Cochran
& Cochran, who thereupon were permitted to
draw and drew against said check, sums aggregating $652.41, and that the bank became thereby
the owner thereof. Thereafter payment upon s>aiJd
check was stopped, and this suit was instituted
to recover the amount thus paid out, $652.41, together with interest at 8 per cent, from December
16, 1925. Cochran & Cochran failed to appear,
and judgment was entered against them in the
county court.
"The defendants the Rockwell Investment
·Company and the Parker Realty Company answered, admitting the execution and delivery of
said check, and that payment thereof had been
stopped because of alleged fraud perpetrated by
the payees upon the makers. By stipulation, the
allegations contained in the complaint and answer,
for the purposes of the trial, were admitted as
if proven. The county court thereupon entered
judgment for the defendant, from which plaintiff
appealed to the district court. Upon a trial there,
under a similar stipulation, judgment was again
rendered in favor of the defendants, which the
plaintiff now seeks to review, contending that
the court erred in failing to render judgment
for the plaintiff.

15
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"From the foregoing, it is apparent that the
sole question for determination of this court is:
Was the Broadway Bank the owner of s.aid check
or merely an .agent of the depositors for coUection? If tvtle to the check passed to the bamlc, it
should recover, otherwise not.
"[1, 2] We have held that, where a check is
drawn on one bank and unconditionally deposited
in another, the latter becomes merely an agent
of the depositor, and title does not pass to said
bank; and further that, under such circumstances,
iJf the bank of deposit extends credit and permits
the depositor to withdraw the amount of the check,
the bank becomes the owner thereof. See Union
Bank v. Motor Company, 70 Colo. 132, 197 P. 753;
Manatee Bank v. Fruit Company, 70 Colo. 342,
201 P. 560; First National Bank v. Fleming State
Bank, 74 Colo. 309, 221 P. 891 and Scully v.
Denver National Bank, 76 Colo. 227, 230 P. 610.
"Defendant corporations contend that the
provisions contained in the deposit slip aforesaid
are controlling, and that thereby the bank became
merely an agent of the depositor, and that the
subsequent extension of credit to the depositor
and withdrawal of funds did not change the contract of deposit so as to then pass title to the
bank. In support thereof, the Fleming case, supra,
is cited. We are of the opinion that this case is
not decisive of defendants' claims . . ."

"
"'In this state the general custom and understanding is that, when a customer deposits in
his bank checks drawn on another bank, they are
received for collection, and are charged to the
custon1er's account if dishonored. Some banks,
by way of precaution, print upon their deposit
slips notice to this effect. The banks generally,
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in the absence of special notice, regard such
transactions as deposits for collection, and, even
when credited to a checking account, the right
recognized by the law merchant to charge back
to the account a dishonored check is exercised.
Town of Manitou v. First Nat. Bank of Colorado
Springs, 37 Colo. 344, 356, 86 P. 75.'
"[3] Applying these principles to the instant
case, we must necessarily hold that the intention
of the parties is controlling: that, pursuant to
the provisions of the depos~t slip, plaintiff bank,
at the time of deposit, was merely an agent to
collect; that, when it credited the .amount of saiJd
check to the payees' account, and thereupon pa~d
to them $652.41 on account thereof, ~t thereby
electe:d not to exercise the right to decU'ne payment thereof as provided by the te.rms of sa~d
deposit slip; and that the payment so made and
the receipt thereof by the depositor evidenced an
intenti;on of the parties that a sale of said check
be consummated, and the bank thereby became
the owner of sai;d check.
"Our conclusions herein are fortifved by all
of the Colorado cases hereinabove set forth. Defendant authorized the circulation of their negotiable instrument in the commercial world, and
thereby represented that it was their valid and
binding obligation to pay the amount thereof to
any innocent party who held the same for value
and without notice of any claimed infirmity. It
would be unjust and inequitable under all the
circumstances in this case to hold that the plaintiff bank, an entirely innocent party, should suffer
a loss of $652.41. Certainly, in all fairness, as
between plaintiff bank and the defendants, the
loss should fall upon the defendants which cause
it to exist.
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"The judgment of the lower court is therefore reversed, with directions to enter judgment
for the plaintiff in the sum of $652.41, together
with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent
per annum from December 16, 1925, to date.
"Reversed."
Argument was made by appellant in the court below
that the recent Colorado case, Cox} et al vs. Metropolitan
State Bank} Inc. et alJ 336 P2d 742 (1959) overruled
Bromfveld vs. Cochran. This is clearly not so, for the
following reasons.
In the Cox case four of the five judges of the court
each wrote a separate opinion. There were two specially
concurring opinions, and two of the judges dissented.
The case was decided by two of the five on a theory of
law entirely different from that expressed in Bromf~eld
vs. Cochran} i.e., that under the facts of the Cox case
the check deposited was the subject of a trust, and
that the depositor had no beneficial interest in it. These
two judges did not mention the Bromfield case in any
way. Further, the specially concurring opinion of Justice
Frantz, relied on by appellant below, quotes from and
cites the Bromfield case without any expression of disapproval.
Justice Frantz' specially concurring opinion is not
the opinion of the court. Actually, it only concurs in
the result, on a different theory. The dissenting opinion
of Justice Hall, in which Chief Justice Knauss joined
without reservation, is certainly entitled to as much
weight. At page 758, Justice I-Iall says:
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''I find not one word in this specially concurring opinion that sanctions one word of the
1najority opinion, and in my humble opinion it
might with equal if not greater propriety be
labelled 'dissenting' instead of 'concurring.'"
Appellant also argues that there is no evidence of
an intention concurred in by both Arnn (the payeedepositor) and the respondent bank to change respondent's status fron1 agent-to-collect to owner. There is
such evidence. See Stipulation paragraphs 5 and 6 (R.
8). If anyone knew that the consideration for the check
had failed, Arnn knew it. He was the promissor. He
must have known that as a consequence it was likely
not to be paid. Nevertheless, he sought respondent's
paYJnent of checks, totaling more than $2,000, drawn
by him subsequently against the same account- checks
which he Inust have known would seriously overdraw
the account if the Pinder check was not paid. And respondent, in good faith, did pay those checks when they
were presented. Contracts may be changed by the parties
to them by implication as well as by express agreement.
See 12 Am J ur 1006, §428.
This subject is discussed thoroughly in a recent
annotation in 59 ALR 2d 1173, entitled "Crediting proceeds of negotiable paper to depositor's account, as
constituting bank a holder in due course." The annotator concludes, at page 1187, that:
"The general rules that a bank is a holder
in due course when the proceeds of the deposited
itmn have been withdrawn from the account or
other-mse applied have been followed by most
of the courts considering the question, notwith-
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standing the fact that the instrument may have
been received by the bank for collection, or the
proceeds credited provisionally to the account of
the depositor. [Citing 17 jurisdictions, including
Colorado's Bromfield vs. Cochran, in support.]"
Attention is particularly called to the following
sections of this annotation
"§5. Proceeds partially withdrawn.
"·§6. Receipt for collection, or conditionally;
indorsement for deposit only.
"·§7. What amounts to withdrawal or credit,
generally; computation."
It is significant that the ALR 2d Supplement Service, 1960 Issue, does not cite Cox vs. Metropolitan State
Bank in any way in connection with this annotation.
Whichever rule might be deemed to best meet the
needs of the business and financial community, it is
respectfully suggested that the Court's function in our
case is not to determine this. Rather, in this confict of
laws situation, this court will determine what the law
of Colorado is - not what, perhaps, it should be.
BromfiJeld vs. Cochran is definite and certain in
its holding that under circumstances present in our case
a bank is a holder in due course.
POINT III.
PROTEST OF THE CHECK WAS NOT REQUIRED, AND
THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT DRAWER IS NOT DISCHARGED.

Appellant contends that failure of respondent to
protest the check discharged appellant.
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The general conflicts rule governing the necessity
of protest as a condition of holding the drawer of a
bill is deterrnined by the law of the place where the
bill was drawn. 11 Am Jur 443, Conflict of Laws §149.
But since there is no showing that the law requiring
or dispensing with protest is any different in Colorado
than in Utah, Colorado law may be deemed to be the
same as Utah's in this connection. In fact, appell~nt has
relied upon the Utah statute in his Point III.
Appellant intimates that respondent cannot decide
whether to treat the check as inland or foreign. This
is not true. Respondent has not been, and will not be,
evasive about this. It is in accord with the proposition
that this check is a foreign bill, executed and delivered
outside of Utah (R. 15 and Statement of Proceedings).
It believes this to_ be the fact. Respondent acknowledges
that it did not protest the instrument and that iJf, under
the facts disclosed by the record, protest was required,
respondent cannot prevail.
It is true that foreign bills of exchange must ordinarily be protested. UCA, 1953, 44-2-27 (NIL §152).
Was the check in question a foreign bill appearing on
its face to be such~
It is foreign in fact (it was executed and delivered
in Colorado) but it appears on its face to be an inland
bill (purports to be both drawn and payable in Utah).
See Britton on Bills and Notes (1943) §225.
21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UCA, 1953, 44-2-27 (NIL §152) states:
". . . Where a bill does not appear on its
face to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case
of dishonor is unnecessary."
There is another reason why appellant's contention
that this check was required to be protested is insupportable. UCA, 1953, 44-2-34 (NIL §159) provides:

"When protest dispensed with-Protest is
dispensed with by any circumstances which would
dispense with notice of dishonor.... "
U·CA, 1953, 44-1-116 (NIL §114) provides:

"When notvce need not be given to drawerNotice of dishonor is not required to be given to
the drawer in any of the following cases:
" (5) Where the drawer has countermanded
payment."
See Stipulation paragraph 7 (R. 8).
Britton on Bills and Notes (1943) §221, states the
reason for the foregoing rules as follows, at page 928:
"Notice of dishonor to the drawer is not required where, in the language of Section 114(5),
he 'has countern1anded payment,' for ·the reason
that the drawer's own act causes the dishonor of
the instrument. A drawer of a check who stops
payment thereon is therefore not entitled to
notice of dishonor, nor is he entitled to presentment of such check, for it is held, under Section
79 that the stop order n1akes the situation one
where the drawer 'has no right to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will pay the
instrument.'"
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Appellant contends, at page 19 of his brief, that
a duty to protest existed, notwithstanding the foregoing,
because respondent did not know of the stop-payment
order until later. Appellant entirely overlooks a basic
reason for the rules dispensing with notice of dishonor
and protest, i.e., to inform the drawer that his secondary
liability has ripened, so that he may promptly take appropriate action. The purpose for the rule, requiring
protest, is for the holder to do something that is usually
useful to the drawer -not to require the holder to do
a useless, meaningless act.
The check was marked "refer to maker" but was
returned unpaid because payment had been stopped.
Stipulation paragraph 7 (R. 8) states :
'". . . defendant notified the Midvale Branch
of the Sandy City Bank to refuse payment and
said Bank for such reason did refuse payment
when the check was presented."
Exhibit A annexed to Defendant's Demand for Admission (R. 6) reads:
" ... This check was subsequently processed
by an officer of the Bank, who, knowing of the
Stop-Payment Order, designated the check to be
returned marked 'Refer to Maker.'

"

"I further certify that on October 20, 1956,
if payment had not been stopped O'YI the check
described, this bank would have pa~d that check,
even though it would have resulted in an overdraft of $531.54."
. A.ccordingly, it is evident that protest of this check
was not required and that appellant is not discharged
from liability for it.
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POINT IV.
INTERES'T SHOULD BE COMPUTED FROM THE DATE
OF DISHONOR.

Interest owing to respondent, upon non-payment of
the check, should be computed from the date of dishonor
at the rate of six per cent per annum, irrespective of
whether the law of Utah or the law of Colorado is
deemed to apply for such purpose. The governing principles and the rate of interest are the same in both jurisdictions. UCA, 1953, 15-1-1. Colorado Revised Statutes,
1953, 73-1-2. The Colorado section declares:

"Creditors allowed six per cent- Creditors
shall be allowed to receive interest, when there
is no agreement as to the rate thereof, at the
rate of six per cent per annum, for all moneys
after they become due, on any bill, bond, promissory note or other instru1nent of writing, . . .
[balance of section not material]."
In Bromfield vs. Cochran, interest was computed
from the date of the check. In our case it should be
computed at least from the date of dishonor, October
20, 1956.
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CONCLUSION
The facts as stated in the record on appeal, including
the supplemental record, are controlling, of course. No
one seriously pretends that the law of the State of
Wy01ning is in any way involved.
The law of Colorado is applicable under recognized
conflict of laws rules, be~ause the check was drawn
there and it was transferred to respondent there. The
place of transfer is preferred by most recent authorities in detennining the status of a holder as against
the drawer. But either doctrine invokes the law of Colorado in this case.
Under the rule declared in Bromf~eld vs. Cochra;n,
plaintiff is a holder in due course and, therefore, failure
of consideration is not a defense.
Bromfield vs. Cochran declares the law of Colorado
at the present time. Further, it follows the general rule
that a bank becomes the owner of a check deposited
with it when it extends credit to the depositor and permits the depositor to withdraw against such credit,
notwithstanding the deposit agreement provides that the
bank is merely an agent for collection.

Protest is dispensed with by any circumstance-s
which dispense with notice of dishonor. Notice of dishonor is not required to be given to the drawer where
the drawer has countermanded payment. Appellant
stopped payment of the instant check.
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Interest should be computed from the date of dishonor under the circumstances present in this case. The
applicable rate of interest is six per cent per annum.
.Accordingly, respondent respectfully sub1nits that
the lower court's judgment awarding respondents
$2,216.03 principal should be affirmed, and interest at
the rate of six per cent per annum from October 20,
1956, to date should be awarded in addition thereto.
CHARLES WELCH and
VICTOR A. SPENCER
By Victor A. Spencer
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent

Received two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent this ~--------------- day of March, 1960.

'

Irving H. Biele
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
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